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TERRY L. ANDERSON*

Viewing Land Conservation through
Coase-Colored Glasses
ABSTRACT
In his seminal article, "The Problem of Social Cost," Ronald
Coase emphasized that people have competing demands for
resources and that clear assignment of property rights to those
resources allows demanders to resolve their competing demands
through bargaining and contracting. Of course, the bargaining
will be constrained by transaction costs. This article examines
how contracting is used to produce land conservation and how
transaction costs such as agglomeration costs, joint production
costs, unowned input costs, and non-profit agency costs
constrain the potential for such contracting. It specifically
considers how contracting can be used to produce recreational
amenities, open space, and wildlife habitat.
Ronald Coase's seminal article, "The Problem of Social Cost,"'
provides a lens through which virtually any natural resource or
environmental problem can be viewed. In contrast to thinking strictly
about these problems as externalities where costs are not borne by the
producer, Coase's approach emphasizes that people have competing
demands for the use of resources. He did not specifically apply his
theorem to environmental problems, mainly because they were not in
vogue in 1960. Nonetheless, Coase did discuss the use of air as a medium
for waste disposal, the problem of odors wafting across property
boundaries, and the problem of noise produced by one party bouncing
off the eardrums of another. In each of these cases, he shifted the focus
from externalities where the parties disposing of waste, generating
odors, or creating noise are competing for scarce air space to contracting
for property rights to the scarce air space where transaction costs will
affect the ability of the parties to contract.
Put simply, the Coase theorem argues that demanders
competing for a scarce resource will be able to resolve their competing
demand through voluntary bargaining or contracting if property rights
are well-specified and transaction costs are sufficiently low. More
surprisingly, he shows that the allocation of resources will be unaffected
by the initial distribution of property rights to the scarce resources if
*
1.
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transaction costs are zero. Far from suggesting that bargaining would
solve all competing resource questions or that assuming zero transaction
costs reflected real world bargaining, Coase was trying to get lawyers
and economists to shift away from the concept of externalities and focus
on the complex problems of establishing property rights and contracting
subject to transaction cost constraints. As Coase noted many years after
his seminal publication, the assumption of zero transaction costs "makes
clear the fundamental role which transaction costs do, and should, play
in the fashioning of the institutions which make up the economic
2
system."
This article emphasizes the paramount importance of transaction
costs in land conservation. It starts by recognizing that land conservation
is a shorthand term used as a catchall for many different services
demanded from land and that producing those services has opportunity
costs to the extent that their production precludes other production. For
example, land conservation might mean preservation of open space in
the form of "amber waves of grain," in which case farming is
complementary to conservation, but conversion of farm land into
suburban housing developments competes with it. As long as the
property rights to land are well-defined, enforced, and transferable and
the transaction costs low, the owner will sell the land to the userfarmer, conservationist, or developer-who values it most highly.
However, if the property rights are not well-specified or the transaction
costs are so high that they dwarf potential gains from trade, contracting
between the landowner and the demander will not be possible. For
example, the cost of charging people who enjoy open space may be
prohibitive so that the free-rider problem makes it impossible to raise
sufficient funds through voluntary transactions to pay the landowner to
keep the land in farming. Or fragmented landownership may make the
transaction costs prohibitive for a person or group trying to aggregate
many small parcels into one that is large enough to produce the desired
open space.
Interpretation of the Coase theorem and its policy implications
vary mainly based on perceptions of how significant transaction costs
are. If transaction costs are low, gains from trade will be possible,
markets will result in contracts to resolve conflicting uses, and
governmental intervention will not be necessary. If transaction costs are
prohibitive, on the other hand, markets are said to fail, and
governmental intervention may be justified.

2.
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Because measuring transaction costs is an empirical matter and
quantification is not always easy, people disagree about whether
voluntary transactions can resolve competition for resources. Are the
transaction costs associated with excluding nonpayers from enjoying the
benefits of open space or wildlife habitat so high that those amenities
will be under-produced by markets? Is the underproduction severe
enough to warrant the taxing power of government as a way of
overcoming the free-rider problem? Does the use of the government's
taxing power allow demanders of conservation amenities to get a free
lunch and hence demand more than the optimal amount of land
conservation?
This article will not attempt to specifically answer these
questions but will provide insights into their answers by considering the
various options that are used to produce land conservation in a Coasean
world of positive transaction costs. While governmental intervention
may be justified on positive economic grounds, there is abundant
evidence that private transactions have grown with the rising demand
for land conservation amenities. Consider the exponential growth of
land trusts from 52 in 1950 to over 1200 in 2000, controlling more than six
million acres. These organizations recognize traditional property rights
to land and utilize property law arrangements, including conservation
easements, to gain control of land inputs whose alternative uses would
compete with the land services they desire. This suggests that transaction
costs are low enough to allow a market for some conservation amenities.
Of course, the activities of land trusts often are "subsidized" either
through direct governmental funding or through the tax deductibility of
contributions. 3 This suggests that land conservation demanders have
convinced political agents that land conservation is a public good subject
to sufficient free-rider problems to warrant governmental support or that
those demanders are rent seeking to get their services provided at the
expense of others. In either case, understanding the importance of
transaction costs for market exchanges or for collective action helps
illuminate how competing uses of land resources are resolved.
This article will use the Coasean lens of transaction costs to
examine land conservation. Viewed through this lens, land conservation
is a matter of demanders of conservation amenities purchasing land or
contracting with its owners for land use. Whether trades will take place
depends on the value of the conservation values relative to the value of
land in alternative uses and on the transaction costs. The article will
3.

See GEOFFREY HEAL, BUNDLING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GooDs (working paper, 2001),
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consider the costs of charging demanders of land conservation for the
amenities they enjoy, the costs of purchasing and managing land for
producing conservation amenities, and the costs of renting, leasing, or
otherwise obtaining partial rights to land (e.g., through conservation
easements) for producing conservation amenities. These transaction
costs will be discussed in the context of land conservation contracts that
show how transaction costs affect the potential gains from trade.
TRANSACTION COSTS OF LAND CONSERVATION
Like any market, a market for conservation amenities can be
broken down into a demand and supply side. The demand side depends
on the willingness to pay for the product and the ability of the producer
to collect this willingness to pay from the demanders. The supply side
depends on the opportunity costs of inputs and the transaction costs of
bringing those inputs together in the production process. If the
willingness to pay exceeds the opportunity cost of the inputs, gains from
trade will follow provided that the transaction costs do not create a freerider problem on the demand side or measurement, monitoring, and
agglomeration problems associated with input use on the supply side.
Though Coase is perhaps best known for his article "The
Problem of Social Cost," his insights into transaction costs predate this
seminal piece by decades with his article "The Nature of the Firm." 4 If
the social cost article was not directly aimed at natural resource and
environmental problems, the firm article was even less so. In the earlier
article, Coase argued that the firm is an organization that substitutes
decisions about how factors will be allocated within the firm for market
exchanges outside the firm. The firm either owns inputs outright or
contracts with the owner for the authority to allocate the inputs subject
to the constraints of the contract. For example, the firm might own a
parcel of land and make all decisions about the use of that land in its
production process. Alternatively, the firm might lease the land from
another owner who relinquishes some authority over land use to the
lessee firm. In the former case, the owner of the firm controls all
attributes of the input's use and therefore faces fewer contracting costs
than the lessee who will have to bargain with the input owner regarding
the attributes up for negotiation. Because the transfer of input attributes
is limited in scope and time and because the parties are likely to have
different objective functions, each will have to spend time and effort
specifying and monitoring the terms of the agreement.

4.

Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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Steven Cheung elaborated on Coase's description of the firm by
emphasizing that contracting costs are a driving force in determining the
firm's structure and size.5 In his view, contracting requires that prices be
discovered, that characteristics and attributes of products or services
exchanged be specified, and that contributions of the two parties be
separable. Cheung argues that, because these contracting costs are
eliminated with outright ownership, larger firms owning more assets
have lower contracting costs.
6
One input where outright ownership cannot occur is labor, and
because of this the firm that combines labor with other inputs must
always measure and monitor labor's contribution. Hence, larger firms
owning more physical capital and natural resources to which they must
add labor will face higher costs of managing labor. Coase and Cheung
both recognized that larger firms could save on certain contracting costs,
but larger firms also come with higher agency costs associated with
measuring and monitoring human input. Within a firm, owners delegate
authority to make production and marketing decisions to managers. This
delegation of authority to an agent entails costs of measuring and
monitoring the agent to ensure that he is abiding by the contract and
making allocation decisions that maximize the net value of the output.
]
As Cheung puts it, the net result is that "[t he agency costs of a
monitor, a director, or a manager - which are also transaction costs - rise
as the costs of discovering prices fall. And the suppression will go no
further when at the margin the saving in one type of cost equals the rise
in the other." 7 In other words, firms will supplant market exchanges as
long as the marginal gains from saving on price discovery costs in
market transactions exceed the agency costs of delegation within the
firm. To say that a firm is too large is to say that its marginal agency
costs are greater than the marginal savings in price discovery costs, and
vice versa if the firm is too small.
This nature of the firm helps us think about production of land
conservation amenities. An individual desiring a conservation amenity
might contract directly with the landowner of the output to supply the
amenity. In this case the demander will not own the input, but, instead,
will contract with its owner. The parties to the contract will have to
discover the price of the amenity and specify a contract for measuring
5. See generally Steven N.S. Cheung, The ContractualNature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1983).
6. This is true not just because slavery is illegal and immoral, but because individuals
with free minds can always adjust the contributions that their bodies are making to the
production process.
7. Chueng, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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and monitoring actions by both parties to the transaction with respect to
the enjoyment of that amenity. These contracting costs (or what Cheung
calls price discovery costs) might include specifying to what other uses
the landowner can put the land that could potentially conflict with the
conservation amenity, what actions the conservation demander can take
that might interfere with the landowner, how the willingness to pay for
the amenity will be measured, how and when the price will be charged,
and so on.
As these costs rise, say with the complexity of the desired
amenity and, therefore, the costs of measuring and monitoring
contractual performance, there is an incentive for the conservation
demander to form a firm, purchase the land from the owner, and
produce the amenity himself. If the owner of the firm is the consumer of
the output, no agency costs result because the owner as the consumer of
the output knows what he wants and how to produce it, i.e., the owner
knows how to maximize his own wealth.
If amenity demanders join together in a firm to reduce
contracting costs associated with purchasing the amenity, they will have
to deal with agency costs. In particular, are the managers of the firm
producing what the owners of the firm want, are the managers
producing at minimum cost, and is the firm able to collect sufficient
revenues from demanders to cover the costs of production?
We now turn to these transaction cost questions in the context of
the demand and supply of land conservation amenities. For
organizational purposes, this article will consider the demand side of
contracting for output separate from the supply side of contracting for
production, but it is important to recognize that these transaction costs
may not be independent. The packaging of a product affects the
willingness to pay and the ability to collect, and it affects the cost of
production. Optimal production requires that the firm minimize the
combined contracting costs.
Demand-Side Transaction Costs
Before any individual or group can really understand the
transaction costs of producing and marketing a product or service, the
characteristics of the product or service must be carefully specified. It is
not sufficient to simply say that land conservation is aimed at sustainable
development or ecosystem management. These concepts are too vague
to allow private contractors to know what inputs they will require and to
whom they will market their product or service.
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What are some of the land conservation products of land trusts?
According to the Land Trust Alliance's National Directory of Conservation
Land Trusts,8 the purposes of land trusts vary tremendously including:
"To protect critical open space in our area and to address
environmental issues springing from land use change"
(Brunswick-Topsham Land Trust).9
"To conserve natural resources for the benefit of the general
public" (Cape Elisabeth Land Trust).1°
"To ensure the future of elk and other wildlife by
conserving, restoring, and enhancing natural habitats"
(Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation)."
"To preserve and enhance for the public, the ecological,
natural, scenic, historical, and/or recreational values of
12
land and water" (Great Basin Land and Water Trust).
We can place these land conservation products into three general
categories: recreational, open space, and wildlife habitat.' 3 Recreational
opportunities include walking or biking trails, access to lakes or streams,
or access to public lands. Open space focuses on preventing farmland
from being converted to urban or suburban development or converting
farmland or developed land to more natural conditions such as forests or
even wilderness. Wildlife habitat includes preservation of wetlands for
species in general or preservation or development of habitat for an
endangered species such as the black-footed ferret.
Marketing any of these amenities requires that the producer be
able to collect sufficient revenues to cover the opportunity cost of the
inputs. Collecting these revenues entails transaction costs associated
with the contract between the producer and consumer. In particular, the
producer of land conservation amenities must be able to assess the
willingness of conservationists to pay for a particular amenity and be
able to exclude nonpaying free riders from enjoying the amenity.

8. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
TRuSTS (1998).

1998 NATIONAL

DIRECTORY OF CONSERVATION LAND

9. Id. at 65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 113.
12. Id. at 174.
13. There is a fourth category, historic preservation, that is also important to many
land trusts. Though we will not address it here, historic preservation is subject to the same
types of transaction cost issues.
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The transaction costs associated with assessing willingness to
pay and collecting revenues will vary depending on the nature of the
amenity and on the production organization. It will be much easier to
assess willingness to pay if the land conservation product is similar to
products already on the market, and it will be easier to collect from
potential nonpayers if consumption of the land conservation product
requires actually being on the land.
RecreationalAmenities
Marketing recreation is probably the easiest among the three
categories because there are recreational products already on the market
and because demanders must combine their time and capital with the
land input. If the firm is producing hiking or biking trails, there are
substitutes. Some public parks charge fees, ski areas charge for mountain
biking, and guest ranches sell hiking, horseback riding, and skiing
opportunities. Though these products may not be exactly the same as
land conservation amenities provided by land trusts, they offer a starting
point for determining willingness to pay.
In each of these recreational examples, the demanders will have
to cross a property boundary to enjoy the amenity, at which point it is
possible to charge a fee and exclude nonpaying free riders. To be sure,
collecting this fee will entail some costs. A toll booth may be erected at
campgrounds, a ticket or membership may be sold as with ski areas, and
wardens may check users for permits as do river and game keepers on
some properties in Canada and England. Because recreation requires
crossing property boundaries or using facilities such as trails, it is easier
to identify users and charge for access.
While the producer might go to the expense of building a
tollbooth and hiring monitors to patrol for free riders, he might simply
ask people to voluntarily pay and to monitor other users with friendly
moral suasion. Hunting clubs can encourage members to ask those they
encounter in the woods to show proof that they are paying members of
the club. In a public park in Bozeman, Montana, a ski club grooms trails
for cross country skiing and asks users to voluntarily purchase and wear
buttons indicating that they have paid an annual fee. The buttons can be
purchased at local sport shops and are easily identifiable when people
are using the trails. The proceeds from button sales support trail
maintenance. Monitoring to avoid the "free skier problem" is
accomplished by asking users who have paid to kindly remind others
that a fee is requested.
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The monitoring costs will vary with technology. The simplest of
4
technology is a fence and trespassing signs. As Anderson and Hill'
noted, before barbed wire was invented, the costs of defining and
enforcing property rights were higher than after its invention. The
electronic revolution makes the barbed wire revolution seem primitive.
Remote cameras can monitor stop lights to record violators, electronic
devices can detect shoplifters, scanners can read bar codes at toll booths,
and satellites can monitor ingress and egress on the open oceans if
people with the right to enter carry transponders that signal the satellites
that they are legitimate entrants.'5
How much the supplier of the recreational amenity is willing to
spend on monitoring access will depend on the value of the recreational
amenity and the extent to which it is subject to crowding. 16 Think about
how many strands of wire are optimal for a fence. If it is simply a matter
of demarcating a boundary, one strand may be sufficient. If it is a matter
of keeping in valuable wildlife, twelve strands with electrification may
be appropriate. And if it is a matter of excluding nonpayers from
viewing a valuable scene such as a baseball game, a high board fence
may supplant strands of wire.
Not only is exclusion dependent on an individual's willingness
to pay, it will be dependent on the interaction of individuals. If many
people can enjoy the amenity at the same time without diminishing the
experience of others, there is less incentive to monitor each user as long
as sufficient fees can be collected to produce the amenity. In this case,
there is no need to restrict the number of entrants at any one time so that
a membership fee with no marginal price for each visit may be the best
way to maximize revenues. On the other hand, if the value of the
recreational experience diminishes with crowding, a higher marginal
price may be necessary to limit the number of users and raise the
necessary revenues. Hunting clubs that pay for habitat and access
recognize the congestion problem and therefore limit the number of
people who can hunt on any particular day.

14. Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill. The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West. 18 J.L. & EcON. 163, 172 (1975).
15. Daniel Huppert & Gunnar Knapp, Technology and Property Right in Fishery
Management, in THE TEcHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 79, 92-93 (Terry L. Anderson &
Peter J. Hill eds., 2001).
16. This can be thought of in the context of establishing property rights as described by
Anderson and Hill, supranote 14, at 178.
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Open Space Amenities
Exclusion of free riders who enjoy other conservation amenities
is more difficult if the demander can enjoy the amenities without
crossing the property boundary, as may be the case with open space
scenery. The cost of collecting from those who enjoy open space will
depend on a number of variables. First, it is easier to collect if the open
space amenity can be inseparably packaged with a specific asset such as
a house. In that case, the amenity value will be incorporated into the
asset's value. Hence land developers have an incentive to incorporate
open space amenities into housing developments, enabling them to
charge a higher price for the houses.
In Boise, Idaho, for example, Peter S. O'Neill recognized the
growing demand for conservation amenities in an urban setting and
responded by building communities for people as well as fish. He
revitalized a river and created one of the nation's first urban spawning
streams for trout. O'Neill recognized that visually pleasing and
biologically productive surroundings are assets that add to property
value. Hence, his housing developments offer free-flowing trout streams,
lush streamside vegetation, and biologically diverse lakes and wetlands.
Creating or restoring these amenities is expensive, but because they are
enjoyed mainly by the homeowners, their value is captured in the price
people pay for the homes. If there is some free riding due to the fact that
his trout streams produce fish that migrate to publicly accessible waters,
enough of the value is internalized by the prices in the housing
development that Peter O'Neill can profit from his investment. Add to
his profits some philanthropy motivated by O'Neill's fishing passion and
the result is privately provided conservation amenities.
If producers of open space cannot capitalize the value of open
space into the value of more easily marketed assets, the free-rider
problem is more costly to overcome. Public highways, for instance,
exacerbate the collection problem because people who drive on such
highways can enjoy open space scenery without paying. Getting people
to pay a toll for a public highway may not be technologically or
politically feasible. Charging tolls for a scenic amenity may be costly
because some people may be using the highway strictly for
transportation and not be getting much value out of the open space

amenity.
If a roadway with scenic value is privately owned, however,
there is an incentive for the owner of the asset to find ways of collecting
for the scenic amenity. The 17-Mile Drive along Pebble Beach provides
an example. This private highway is a popular tourist attraction in
California. Developer Samuel Morse bought the land along Pebble Beach
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and built houses and golf courses whose prices included some of the
value of the open space amenity. To capture the value from non-resident
viewers, drivers must enter through guarded gates and pay an $8-fee for
the 17-mile drive, taking all day if they wish.
Where the transaction costs of charging for open space amenities
are high, the potential free-rider problem may justify the call for the
power of taxation. Just as special improvement districts can be formed to
prevent the free-rider problem in the construction of sidewalks or the
paving of streets, such districts can tax local residents to provide open
space. The geographic scope of the benefits from open space would
determine the optimal size of the funding district. If the value of the
open space accrues mainly to local homeowners, then the district might
be as small as a few land parcels. If the value accrues to a much wider
population as would be the case if the open space preserves some larger
community values, then the district might be as large as a county or even
a state.
Open space bond issues can be explained on these grounds. In
recent years local and state governments have presented measures to
voters asking for approval of bond issues to provide funds for open
space preservation. Table 117 shows the number of measures presented to
voters between 1998 and 2001, the percentage passed, and the bonding
provided. A passage percentage of 70 percent in 2001 suggests that
voters are enthusiastic about providing tax support for open space, and
the total of more than $19 billion of potential funding for parks and open
space can purchase a significant amount of land or conservation
18
easements. With the public funding overcoming the free-rider problem,
the actual provision of the open space can be made through public or
private agencies.
TABLE 1: LAND CONSERVATION
VOTING RESULTS
1998
1999
2000
2001
126 measures
92 measures
174 measures
137 measures
passed (84%)
passed (90%)
passed (83%)
passed (70%)
$8.3 billion
$1.8 billion
$7.5 billion
$1.7 billion
created
created
created
created
17. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND VoTE 2001: AMERIcANS INVEST IN PARKS AND OPEN
SPACE (2001).
18. It should be noted that the public choice literature raises questions about whether
inefficiencies associated with the potential free rider are not offset by inefficiencies
associated with rent seeking. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND PRIVATE
LAND STEWARDSHIP (working paper, 1998), available at http://www.privateconservation.
org/pubs/mono/easements.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
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Wildlife Amenities
Provision of wildlife habitat can be treated like a recreational
amenity if the wildlife is used directly as in hunting or photography or if
the provision of wildlife habitat comes in conjunction with other land
uses such as camping, hiking, and so on. In such cases, only those who
actually physically enjoy and pay for use of the amenity will be allowed
to cross the property boundary. As such demands have grown, the
market has responded.
In South Africa, a company known as Conscorp, started in 1990,
has been a pioneer in capturing amenity values related to wildlife.
Conscorp asks people "to invest in conservation, not to donate to it,"
says co-founder Dave Varty. The company generally owns only small
land parcels, enough to accommodate its lodges. For the rest, it contracts
with surrounding landowners for conservation services. Rather than
tying up capital in vast tracts, Conscorp contracts for access to private
lands for game viewing and hunting. The contracts are complex
documents that constrain both landowners and Conscorp so as to
maximize the wildlife experience. Architecture is regulated to fit the
African tradition, hunting is coordinated so that hunters do not interact
with photographers and watchers, domestic livestock is limited to
certain areas, perimeter fences are maintained by a combined effort of
Conscorp and the landowner, interior fences are not allowed, and the list
goes on. Though contracting costs are high, the company turned a profit
in just four years from its start.
In California there are at least two firms, Golden Ram and
Wilderness Unlimited, that contract with private landowners for the
provision of outdoor experiences including hunting, fishing, camping,
and hiking. Among the many services these firms provide are restricted
entry to the land, maintenance of campsites, improvement of wildlife
habitat, and provision of insurance. With thousands of acres under
contract and hundreds of members, such firms are providing a model for
similar firms in other states. 19
The provision of wildlife habitat may be subject to greater freerider problems since wildlife are not consumed directly, but instead
provide existence values. 20 (Existence values mean that people derive
19. See generally GOLDEN RAM SPORTSMAN'S CLUB website, at http://www.golden
ramhunting.com (last visited Aug. 5, 2004); see also WILDERNESS UNLIMITED, HUNTING,
FISHNIG AND CAMPING WILDERNESS UNLIMITED, at http://www.outdoojournal.com/
wuhome/index.htm (last visited Aug. 5,2004).
20. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Donald J. Boudreaux & Roger E.
Meiners, Existence Value and Other of Life's Ills, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 153 (Peter
J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).
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value from the wildlife and wildlife habitat simply by knowing they
exist, but not by actually hunting, photographing, or observing them.)
Even where existence values may be significant, however, entrepreneurs
may successfully be able to collect some of the value as organizations
such as The Nature Conservancy prove. The Nature Conservancy
provides many preserves that are seldom visited by members, but the
members contribute in return for a magazine with lots of pictures and for
other outward badges (bumper and window stickers, pins, ties, etc.) that
show they have contributed. Total revenue for the Nature Conservancy
in 2001 was over $546 million, of which $392 million came from dues and
contributions. Though it does not break down the latter two categories,
we can infer that with dues of $25 per year, the one million members
contribute $25 million. The individual dues especially suggest that the
Nature Conservancy is finding ways to overcome the free-rider problem
by making members part of the club.
In each of these three amenity categories, the extent of the freerider problem will be determined by the transaction costs and the ability
of entrepreneurial producers to find ways for lowering those costs. The
more entrepreneurs can reduce the transaction costs, the more they will
be able to capture a share of the gains from trade associated with
providing the conservation amenity.
Supply-Side Transaction Costs
Transaction costs also play a pivotal role in determining the
production process. A typical textbook analysis of production focuses
solely on the technical relationship that determines the substitution
between inputs that will minimize the cost of production given the
relative prices of the inputs. Once transaction costs are introduced,
however, the production function is only part of the production calculus;
organizers of production must also consider the measurement,
monitoring, and agency costs discussed above.
Taking as given the demand for land conservation amenities and
the costs of marketing the land conservation amenities, we can ask what
contractual arrangements reduce or minimize the transaction costs
associated with production. These costs arise from four types of
contracting costs: agglomerating land parcels of sufficient size to
produce the amenity, producing joint outputs, utilizing unowned inputs,
and monitoring managers in a non-profit setting.
Agglomeration Costs
As with all production, inputs cannot always be divided into
sizes that are optimal compared to other inputs. For example, in the case
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of farming, a tractor is not infinitesimally divisible so that it can be sized
optimally to unite with labor and land in production. In the case of open
space, fragmented ownership of land parcels may raise the transaction
costs of producing open space. 2' Suppose, for example, that an open
space must be at least 100 acres for it to provide a value that can be
marketed; anything smaller will either not produce an amenity value for
which people are willing to pay or will have prohibitive transaction costs
associated with excluding nonpayers. If all land is owned in units of 100
acres or more, the demander of open space who values open space
greater than the opportunity costs of 100 acres in its present use will be
able to acquire the land by negotiating with one landowner. 2 Of course,
there will be negotiation costs, but these costs will be lower than if all
land is held in parcels of one acre because then the demanders would
have to negotiate with 100 landowners. This would raise the transaction
costs, reduce the net gains from trade, and decrease the likelihood that a
market exchange will produce the open space. Hence, all else equal, land
conservation amenities should be easier to produce through markets
where landownership is in larger parcels.
Media mogul, and now land mogul, Ted Turner provides an
example of how large, contiguous land parcels can lower transaction
costs and encourage private land conservation. His landholding in the
United States now totals more than three million acres. These properties
are all large and in most cases were that way when he bought them. In
other words, he did not have to put together many small parcels to
constitute a unit that was viable for his conservation agenda. The Flying
D Ranch in southwest Montana is indicative, encompassing more than
100,000 deeded acres that was one cattle ranch until Turner bought it in
1989 from the Shelton Ranches. Because the ranch is so large, it can
provide range for thousands of bison and still be managed for wildlife
such as elk and deer. In the case of elk, populations have risen from 757
to over 3000 in 1996. 23 The increase was achieved by restricting access
and limiting the number of bulls harvested. The transaction costs of

21. For a formal model of the problems associated with agglomeration costs applied to
wildlife, see Dean L. Lueck, The Economic Organizationof Wildlife Institutions, in WILDLIFE IN
THE MARKETPLACE (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1995); see generally Dean L.
Lueck, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 NAT. REsouRcEs J.
625 (1995).
22. The transaction costs will rise if the land parcels have differential abilities to
produce the amenities. In this case, landowners that produce higher amenity rents will be
able to hold out for a larger share of the gains from trade in the bargaining process.
23. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENvIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING GOOD WHILE
DOING WELL 75-77 (1997).
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restricting access and managing the property as a unit would be much
greater if the land had been owned by multiple owners.
Joint ProductionCosts
When the same inputs can be used to produce different outputs,
two types of questions arise. First, how should the two products be
priced, and second, what are the tradeoffs (if any) between outputs in the
production process?
Meat and hides from cattle illustrate the pricing problem. A
cattle producer taking his beef to market will be left with a by-product,
the hide. If the price of beef covers the cost of producing the beef, any
price for the hide will provide pure profit. With competition among
buyers of hides, the price of hides will be bid up to the market value of
the hides, and the cattle grower will receive all the profits. However, if
the market for hides is not competitive, buyers will negotiate with sellers
for a share of those profits.
Land conservation amenities are often produced jointly with
some other output such as agricultural crops where the crops cover the
opportunity cost of the land. If so, land conservation is a by-product for
which any payment generates rents for the landowner. Who captures
those rents will depend on the degree of competition by demanders and
suppliers. If there are many demanders vying for a unique parcel of
land, the owner of the unique land will capture the rents associated with
its unique values. In the case where land conservation amenities are
readily substitutable, i.e., not unique, competition among landowners
jointly producing agricultural crops and amenities will receive no rents
and the prices of amenities will be driven down.
In contrast to land uses that are complementary to one another,
some land uses may directly compete with one another. For example,
suppose that land can be used to produce agricultural output or
recreational amenities where recreational activities reduce crop output. If
the costs of measuring and monitoring recreational users are zero so that
it is easy to determine the crop reduction caused by recreation, the
competing use becomes a simple Coasean bargaining problem.
Assuming that the crop producer has a right to have her production free
from disruption by recreationists, the recreational demanders will have
to pay for the foregone crop production.
Suppose, however, that there are measurement and monitoring
costs associated with identifying the cause and cost of damage. Is the
reduced crop production due to hikers or vagaries in the weather? If it is
due to hikers, is it due to those who have contracted with the crop owner
or due to those who might have trespassed? These questions imply
higher transaction costs and reduced potential net gains from trade.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

Again, thinking in terms of Coase's lesson on the logic of
transaction costs, we must ask whether transaction costs will be lower if
the land is owned by the farmer and leased to recreationists, or if it is
owned by the recreationists and leased to the farmer for growing crops.
The amenity demander may be in a better position to monitor his own
activities that potentially conflict with other production. Hikers can
monitor other members of their group, or hunters may agree to a code of
ethics and monitor other members of the hunting club, thus reducing
irresponsible behavior. If this is the case, it may make sense for the
amenity demander to own the land and produce the land conservation
amenity while leasing out the crop production. Under this arrangement,
the crop producer would pay a lower lease price for production knowing
that she would experience some crop reduction.
If the amenity demand is entrepreneurial, i.e., is new and
therefore has relatively unknown effects, ownership by the amenity
entrepreneur may reduce transaction costs because of the information
cost associated with estimating the costs of producing the amenity and
reducing crop production. Buchanan and Faith 24 argue that
entrepreneurs have more information about their entrepreneurial
activities and are more optimistic about potential negative effects of their
activities. Similarly, Barzel 25 points out that the owner of the firm will be
the entrepreneur who can reduce the measurement and monitoring costs
that are inherent in the firm.
In cases where the cost of measuring the production of joint
outputs is lower for the amenity demander, we can expect that
demander to own land and take action to optimize the joint production.
The Nature Conservancy's ownership of the Pine Butte Preserve offers
an example. In north-central Montana, The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
owns a 13,000-acre preserve that provides the last remaining prairie
grizzly bear habitat in the lower 48 states.26 During certain times of the
year, the grizzly bears migrate to the preserve to forage on new sprouts,
roots, and berries. The rest of the time the bears live mostly on public
wild lands where they seldom interact with livestock. If a cattle rancher
owned the land, he would face bear predation if he leased his land to
TNC. Of course, TNC could pay the cost of predation, but transaction
24. See generally James M. Buchanan & Roger L. Faith, Entrepreneurship and the
Internalization of Externalities,24 J.L. & ECON. 95 (1981).
25. Yoram Barzel, Property Rights in the Finn, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT AND LAW 48,49 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
26. For additional information, see THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, PINE BUTTE SWAMP
PRESERVE, CHOTEAU, MT, at http://nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/states/
montana/preserves/art342.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
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costs would result from the moral hazard problem as the landowner
might put his cattle in harm's way. By owning the preserve, TNC
monitors cattle and minimizes predation by keeping livestock out when
the grizzly bears are in. When the grizzly bears are not there, it leases
grazing to livestock owners.
Unowned Input Costs
If transaction costs rise with joint production even when all the
inputs are owned, they will rise even more if any inputs are unowned.
For example, if unowned wildlife prey on domestic livestock, it is
difficult for the livestock owner to obtain compensation for his losses
because there is no wildlife owner responsible for the wildlife. 27 Suppose
that existence demanders of wildlife amenities support introduction of a
predator and that the state does not accept the responsibility for
compensation. Because the existence demanders can enjoy knowing the
predator exists without them actually entering the property, transaction
costs will make it virtually impossible for the livestock owner to seek
and receive compensation from the existence amenity demanders. Thus,
they will be able to free ride on the livestock owner. Conflicts between
the landowner-livestock owner and the amenity demanders are
inevitable. Again, the Pine Butte Preserve example is illustrative because,
in effect, TNC internalizes the cost of grizzly bear predation by owning
the territory where predation is most likely without actually owning the
bears.
The conflict between predators and livestock has higher
transaction costs, however, as the territory of the predator increases and
overlaps with multiple livestock owners. 28 This is especially true if
landownership is fragmented into many parcels that must be
agglomerated. The Coase theorem says that resource allocation will be
invariant to liability if transaction costs are zero. The corollary to this
theorem is that liability will matter with positive transaction costs. In the
case of multiple livestock owners and a wide-ranging predator, making
the livestock owners liable creates a potential free-rider problem in that
efforts by one livestock owner to deal with the problem potentially create
benefits for others who do not bear the costs. 29 These transaction costs

27. In some cases the state may take responsibility for the wildlife and compensate
livestock owners.
28. See generally Lueck, supra note 21 (discussing the relationship between wildlife
territory and the size of land holdings).
29. This provides an explanation for why governmental programs including bounties
and government-paid hunters exist to control predators.
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fall if the predator is owned by a single entity that is liable for damages. 3°
In this case, the demander of predator introduction has an incentive to
accept liability or face opposition from livestock owners who may be
able to resist predator introduction or who will have an incentive to kill
the predators if they do not receive compensation.
The wolf compensation program run by Defenders of Wildlife
illustrates how a group can effectively take "ownership" for part of the
wolf's behavior. When reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone
National Park was being debated, livestock owners voiced concern that
they would bear the costs of predation. The federal government took the
position that these were wild animals and that it therefore was not liable
if the wolves migrated out of the park and killed domestic stock. To
defuse some of the opposition, Defenders of Wildlife became a limited
de facto owner of the wolves when it established a privately funded
compensation endowment and offered to pay livestock owners for any
losses due to wolf predation. Clearly, this insurance-type scheme is not
perfect because there are costs of proving whether livestock losses are
due to wolves and because it does not compensate owners for costs
associated with replacing the animals. Nonetheless, the willingness of
wildlife demanders to pay some compensation is a step toward a
contract that reduces transaction costs. Between the inception of the fund
in 1987 and January 2004, Defenders paid compensation totaling
31
$359,124 to 295 livestock owners in Idaho and Montana.
Non-Profit Agency Costs
Agency costs are always an important consideration in
contracting, but they are especially important in the case of non-profit
firms. For-profit firms are disciplined by the bottom line,32 but non-profit
firms have no such measuring stick. Hence, when the amenity demander
contributes to the conservation-producing firm as his agent, he faces
higher costs of monitoring the agent to ensure that the firm is doing
what he expects. Is the conservation agency producing the right
product? Is it producing the product at the minimum cost?
30. For a more complete discussion of viewing wildlife through Coase-colored glasses,
see Terry L. Anderson, Viewing Wildlife Through Coase-Colored Glasses, in WHO OWNS THE
ENVIRONMENT? 259 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).
31. See Defenders of Wildlife, Payments to Ranchers from the Bailey Wildlife
Foundation Wolf Compensation Trust, at http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/
wcstats.pdf (last visited Aug. 5,2004).
32. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing the
principal-agent problem in the context of for-profit firms).
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Parker 33 presents evidence that land trusts are taking into
account many of the relevant transaction costs associated with whether
to own land or hold conservation easements and with the costs of
enforcing easements. Though he does not suggest that the decisions of
non-profit agents are necessarily optimal as compared to what might
occur if agency costs were lower (as they would be with a firm
disciplined by profits), his data do suggest that disciplinary forces do
exist.
These forces may come from Internal Revenue Service reporting
requirements necessary to maintain 501(c)(3) charitable contribution
status, but they are also buttressed by the importance of reputation
capital. To reduce agency costs, non-profit firms have an incentive to
provide independent audits of their actions. These audits give donors
some assurance that funds are being used properly. Similarly, brand
names acquire value among donors who display a conservation group's
logo on their car, tie, or shirt. If agents violate donor expectations, the
value of reputation capital will fall and donations will drop with the fall
in reputation.
The sale of land for development by the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF) illustrates agency costs. Philanthropist Claude Moore
deeded a 357-acre property to the NWF to protect wildlife. The
federation, however, against Moore's wishes, sold the property,
including the Claude Moore Conservation Center, to developers in 1986
for $8.5 million and used the money for other purposes. Dr. Moore sued
trying to stop the development, but lost. 34 As former NWF president Ray
Arnett put it, "NWF was known as the largest conservation education
association in the world. Now they have moved to more advocacy,
35
lobbying."
CONCLUSION
When Ronald Coase wrote his seminal article, "The Problem of
Social Cost," many of the environmental problems that we face today
and many of the solutions did not exist. He discussed the air pollution
issue in the context of hypothetical steel mills and laundries and
presented evidence of how the common law of trespass and nuisance
33. Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or
Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483 (2004).
34. RICHARD POMBO & JOSEPH FARAH, THIS LAND Is OUR LAND: How To END THE WAR
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 142-43 (1996).
35. AUSTIN FULK ET AL., A GUIDE TO NONPROFT ADVOCACY AND POLICY GROUPS

(1997), available at http://www.capitalresearch.org/publications/advocacyguide/Groups
/nwf.html (last visited May 5, 2004).
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had dealt with such problems. Coase's approach has been fleshed out in
the environmental context by Meiners and Yandle 36 and Yandle, 37 who
provide more evidence that common law liability rules can handle many
conflicting resource uses.
Because property rights to land are easier to define and enforce
than property rights to air and water, it is not surprising that contractual
arrangements of the type Coase described are more prevalent with land
conservation. As the demand for conservation amenities has grown with
rising incomes, the market has responded as evidenced by the huge
increase in the number of land trusts and other conservation
organizations. Coase's insights into the potential for property rights and
contracts to resolve conflicting resource uses and into the costs of
organizing firms to produce conservation help us understand how and
why conservationists have organized the way they have. For-profit
housing developers have incorporated open space into their
developments and captured the benefits in property values; non-profit
land trusts have devised innovative easements to reduce transaction
costs; local governments have passed open-space bond issues that
overcome the free-rider problem potentially inherent in purchasing land
or easements to provide open space; and a wildlife group's willingness
to pay for wolf predation has provided a liability mechanism that lowers
transaction costs. Using the Coasean lens helps explain a myriad of
innovative approaches that have evolved.
The articles in this volume, explicitly or implicitly, fit into the
Coasean framework. At the heart of land conservation issues are
transaction costs, and Coase's theories help us see how entrepreneurs
can reduce them to produce more gains from trade. The contractual
approach to conflict resolution is at the heart of free market
environmentalism. The Coase theorem opened an empirical debate
regarding the degree to which transaction costs preclude contracting to
promote efficient resource use. The examples cited in this article and the
following articles suggest that, even though transaction costs are
positive, entrepreneurs can reduce them and resolve competing resource
demands through contractual arrangements.
Using the Coasean lens helps us focus on transaction costs and
contractual terms, but it does not tell us whether an efficient amount of
land conservation is being produced. Indeed, Coase's criticism of Pigou
was that the simplistic notion of private and social costs leads to the
36. Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923 (1999).
37. Bruce Yandle, Coase, Pigou, and Environmental Rights, in WHo OwNs THE
ENVIRONMENT? 119 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998).
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simplistic conclusion that we can know what the efficient amount would
be. Once transaction costs are introduced, efficiency is not such a clear
concept. In fact as Demsetz 38 points out, if we think of transaction costs
just like any other costs, about all that we can say is that the world is
efficient subject to transaction costs. To elaborate, he points out that in a
world of zero transaction costs, Coase's steel mill owner and laundry
owner could integrate their two firms and internalize the costs and
benefits of controlling pollution. In the case of land conservation, the
farmer and the amenity producer could become the same firm. Why
does this integration not take place? The answer is that it would be
inefficient due to transaction costs. But, Demsetz asks, how does this
differ from the case where integration is thwarted due to diseconomies
of scale? In short, Demsetz's conclusion is that costs are costs. In this
sense, markets may not produce the efficient amount (too little) of land
conservation due to transaction costs associated with free riding just as
the political sector might not produce the efficient amount (too much)
due to transaction costs associated with concentrated benefits and
diffuse costs.
So what does the Coasean economist have to offer policy
analysis? We can try to quantify the transaction costs associated with
various institutional arrangements and suggest ways that those
transaction costs can be reduced. This will require detailed analysis of
the institutions as Coase did with lighthouses. 39 With this analysis in
hand, then we can say how the world would differ with different
institutions or technologies that could lower transaction costs. When all
is said and done, we should not be too surprised to find that
entrepreneurs who lower transaction costs and increase the gains from
trade have already done what we policy analysts might predict.

38. Harold Demsetz, Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CoNFLIcr, AND LAW 282 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds.,
2003).
39. See generally Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).

